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Abstract
Turning greenhouse gas emissions pledges into domestic policies is the next chal-
lenge for governments. We address the question of the acceptability of cost-e ective
climate policy in a real-voting setting. First, we analyze voting behavior in a large
ballot on energy taxes, rejected in Switzerland in 2015 by more than 2 million people.
Energy taxes were aimed at completely replacing the current value-added tax. We
examine the determinants of voting and find that distributional and competitive-
ness concerns reduced the acceptability of energy taxes, along with the perception
of ine ectiveness. Most people would have preferred tax revenues to be allocated for
environmental purposes. Second, at the same time of the ballot, we tested the ac-
ceptability of alternative designs of a carbon tax with a choice experiment survey on
a representative sample of the Swiss population. Survey respondents are informed
about environmental, distributional and competitiveness e ects of each carbon tax
design. These impacts are estimated with a computable general equilibrium model.
This original setting generates a series of novel results. Providing information on the
expected environmental e ectiveness of carbon taxes reduces the demand for envi-
ronmental earmarking. Making distributional e ects salient generates an important
demand for progressive designs, e.g. social cushioning or recycling via lump-sum
transfers. The case of lump-sum recycling is particularly striking: it is su cient
to show its desirable distributional properties to make it one of the most preferred
designs, which corresponds to a completely novel result in the literature. We show
that providing proper information on the functioning of environmental taxes can
close both the gap between acceptability ex ante and ex post and the gap between
economists’ prescriptions and the preferences of the general public.
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1 Introduction
During the last decades, countries and international organizations have strug-
gled to define a system of global governance able to tackle climate change. The
Kyoto Protocol spurred the adoption of a first generation of climate policies
(Fankhauser et al. 2015), but much more e ort is required to meet the challenge
of climate change mitigation (IPCC 2014). Unilateral policies have emerged to
partly compensate for the continued failure of international negotiations (Os-
trom 2009; Jordan et al. 2015), but only a fraction of countries opted for energy
and carbon taxes (Baranzini and Carattini 2014; World Bank 2014). Most coun-
tries went for “soft policies” such as subsidies for renewable energies, which in
some cases turned up to be not only strongly regressive but also extremely ex-
pensive (Marcantonini and Ellerman 2014). Vested interests and the general
unpopularity of taxes are the main reasons behind this political choice.
The developments related with the 2015 Conference of Parties to the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the Paris Agreement
have created a major breakthrough in the international negotiations for climate
change mitigation. However, countries’ emissions pledges are not credible policy
commitments. The world is at a turning point: strong domestic policies are now
necessary to meet the Paris pledges at a reasonable cost. Any other outcome is
likely to put the pledge-and-review system under pressure and to jeopardize the
future tightening of current pledges (Baranzini et al. 2015).
How to overcome resistance to energy and carbon taxes is thus of primary
interest. A recent literature has attempted to provide a first set of explanations
to the lack of public support for environmental taxes. Since real ballots on
environmental taxes take place sporadically and so real voting behavior is hard
to observe, most of the literature relies on survey techniques to approximate the
determinants of voting behavior. These surveys are usually realized in neutral
times, i.e. absent any political campaigning. However, vested interests and
media coverage are very powerful drivers of public opinion on environmental
matters (Sampei and Aoyagi-Usui 2009; Jacobsen 2011; Spash and Lo 2012).
On March 8, 2015 the Swiss population was called to vote on a popular initia-
tive aiming at replacing the current value-added tax (VAT) with an energy tax.
About 2.2 million voters expressed their opinion. The proposal was rejected by
a large majority, 92% of voters. Right after the ballot, we collected data on a
representative sample of the Swiss population, to explain the observed voting
behavior. This strategy is used to decrease the likelihood of socially-approved
answers and also allows us to compare our sample with the observed outcome.
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At the same time, we administered a choice experiment to another represen-
tative sample of the Swiss population, taking advantage from the very specific
timing to assess the acceptability of alternative tax designs in presence of high
political salience. In the choice-experiment setting we consider a carbon tax
with four di erent tax rates and five revenue recycling options: income tax re-
bates, reduction of the value-added tax, lump-sum transfers, social cushioning
and earmarking for additional emission abatements through the purchase of for-
eign o sets. We exploit the results of a general equilibrium modeling exercise
to inform respondents on the expected outcomes of each tax design in terms of
energy price increases, emission abatements, overall economic e ects and distri-
butional impacts. In this way, we address some of the most recurrent obstacles to
the popularity of carbon taxes, all of which are arguably driven by imperfect in-
formation: excessive fear of adverse competitiveness and distributional e ects,
perceived ine ectiveness and misunderstanding of revenue neutrality. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the first time such methodological approach is
used. In the choice experiment, respondents face three alternatives: two di er-
ent carbon tax designs, and the status quo. Hence, we reproduce the situation
of real ballots, in which voters are asked to express their opinion on di erent
proposals, with of course the possibility to reject all of them (see Kriesi 2005).
Our study is of interest for all democratic settings, with or without a sys-
tem of direct democracy. We use Switzerland as a laboratory of study, but the
divergence between economists and the general public on the benefits of revenue-
neutral environmental taxes is a recurring problem to environmental tax reforms
all around Europe (Dresner et al. 2006). The unpopularity of carbon taxes has
hampered their implementation in France (Deroubaix and Lévèque 2006), while
fear of competitiveness e ects led to massive exemptions in Scandinavian coun-
tries, decreasing the potential for any sizeable environmental e ect (Baranzini
and Carattini 2014). Similar obstacles reduce the popularity of carbon taxes in
emerging economies, too (Gevrek and Uyduranoglu 2015).
We find that the design of green taxes is the main driver of acceptability, and
that information provision can lead to very di erent results from those in the
literature. Data on voting behavior shows that the chances of the 2015 popular
initiative would have been much higher if tax revenues had been earmarked for
environmental purposes rather than for replacing the VAT, everything else equal.
Concerns about the e ect of higher energy prices on the distribution of income
as well as on the competitiveness of firms are among the main determinants
of rejection. People are also generally skeptics about the potential change in
behavior that energy taxes could generate.
3
The design of our choice experiment addresses all these concerns and provides
a series of original findings. Estimations from our modeling scenarios suggest
that all carbon tax designs under investigation imply limited competitiveness
e ects and all provide significant reduction in emissions. Using the full tax
revenue to purchase foreign o sets allow for massive emission abatements, in the
domain of negative emissions. Most recycling options imply slightly regressive
e ects, except for lump-sum transfers and social cushioning, which (the latter
by design) lead to a net progressive e ect.
A common finding in the literature is that people are most willing to accept a
carbon tax if its revenues are used to strengthen its environmental e ectiveness,
which people believe to be small. This stylized fact is confirmed by our analysis
of voting behavior. However, our choice-experimental setting, by informing on
the emissions reduction associated with the di erent carbon taxes, allows closing
the gap between (possibly low) perceived e ectiveness and (higher) predicted ef-
fectiveness. As a result, we find that earmarking for additional abatements is
no longer particularly attractive. Information on the scenarios’ predictions ren-
ders instead lump-sum transfers and social cushioning particularly popular, by
making salient their progressive properties. The finding for lump-sum transfers
is particularly striking. Despite their minimal administrative burden and the
ability to address distributional concerns (Baranzini et al. 2000; Metcalf 2009),
lump-sum transfers are especially neglected by the literature on the acceptabil-
ity of carbon taxes. The reason for this is that these properties may not to be
perceived by the population, along with revenue neutrality. Our setting shows
however that it is su cient to provide people with some supplementary informa-
tion to reduce the gap between their preferences and economists’ prescriptions.
We find that recycling through income tax rebates is relatively unpopular,
as often found in the literature. People do not seem to understand the concept
of environmental tax reform, or at least they do not see its advantages as some
economists do. We stress that our modeling scenarios do not suggest the ex-
istence of a particular double dividend, i.e. positive economic e ects through
the reduction of distortionary taxes. Reductions in the value-added tax perform
similarly poorly, in terms of acceptability. We also find that the support for
green taxes decreases linearly with the rise in the tax rate. If we simulate based
on our choice experiment the level of acceptability of the popular initiative voted
on March 8 2015, we obtain a figure that is very consistent with the observed
real outcome, indicating a high external validity of the results based on our
choice experiment.
We contribute to the literature on the acceptability of carbon taxes by shed-
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ding new light on the obstacles to the acceptability of carbon taxes. We make
the voting decision in the choice-experimental setting as realistic as possible and
provide people with su cient details to take an informed decision on carbon
taxes. Our results show that making the e ect of environmental taxes salient
can contribute to render relatively unpopular designs much more popular. So
far, the literature has showed that only experiencing the functioning of a given
policy allows citizens to revise their beliefs on the e ectiveness and fairness of
environmental taxes, which by default tend to be overly pessimistic (cf. e.g.
Carattini et al. 2016). Our approach thus provides an alternative to the use of
trials that has been increasingly called for to remedy environmental taxes’ lack
of popularity (Sælen and Kallbekken 2011; Cherry et al. 2014; Carattini et al.
2016). With the proper design and information, acceptable carbon taxes can
exist at a moderately high tax rate, and sustain credible climate policies.
2 Context
2.1 Literature review
The theoretical literature on the political economy of environmental policy
mostly focuses on lobbying by energy-intensive industries (see Oates and Portney
2003 for a review). Yet, Kirchgassner and Schneider (2003) stress the importance
of considering voters’ preferences, and how their pure economic objectives may
compete with other interests, including environmental preferences. The opinion
of the general public may however be biased by media and captured by vested
interests, possibly leading to inaccurate opinion formation and policy-making
(Millner and Ollivier 2015). But citizens can also organize in environmental ad-
vocacy groups and play an active role in the political arena. The model of Dietz
et al. (2012) shows that the presence of green lobbies influencing policymakers
may contribute to increase the stringency of environmental policy, as well as the
likelihood of a stable coalition in environmental agreements.
The theoretical literature usually takes a narrow perspective and presumes
that people rarely vote on policies, but rather for candidates and parties. The
empirical literature has instead taken a broader perspective, assessing for in-
stance the private willingness to pay for climate change mitigation (see Nemet
and Johnson 2010 for a review), as well as the acceptability of specific poli-
cies. The case of environmental taxes has received particular attention. So
popular among economists for reasons of e ciency and environmental e ec-
tiveness (Baranzini et al. 2015) and so unpopular among the general public,
5
they represent a unique opportunity to study the consequences of informational
asymmetries between citizens, policy-makers and experts.
Empirical economists have used a wide range of tools to understand the
determinants of energy taxes’ acceptability. Qualitative assessments using focus
groups have helped understanding the obstacles to the European Environmental
Tax Reform (Dresner et al. 2006) and to environmental taxes more in general
(Kallbekken and Aasen 2010). Qualitative surveys have also been used to orient
quantitative surveys, as in Baranzini and Carattini (2016).
The focus groups of Dresner et al. (2006) revealed the high level of distrust
in environmental tax reforms among the general public. The general public
seems to underestimate the e ectiveness of environmental taxes and to perceive
them mainly as a pretext for raising additional public revenues. People may
only be willing to support their introduction if revenues are clearly earmarked
for environmental purposes. They also wonder how environmental taxes could
green the economy if revenues were to be redistributed. Moreover, they raise
fears of adverse competitiveness and distributional e ects.
These findings from small samples have been then confirmed by larger sur-
veys. Steg et al. (2006) interview about one hundred respondents in the Nether-
lands about the perceived e ectiveness and acceptability of energy subsidies
and taxes. They find subsidies to be much more e ective, at least in people’s
eyes. “Pull measures” (i.e. subsidies) are seen as incentives driving a volun-
tary change in behavior, whereas taxes are felt as coercive measures imposing
a change in behavior and facing people’s resistance. Taxes can however be per-
ceived as e ective if revenues are earmarked for environmental purposes. In
terms of acceptability, instruments and designs that are perceived as e ective
(i.e. subsidies) overperform those that are not (i.e. taxes). Similar results are
provided in Kallbekken and Sælen (2011) based on a Norwegian sample. In
their sample, perceived ine ectiveness of fuel taxes represents a major obstacle
to acceptability, as in the study on the popularity of carbon taxes of Baranzini
and Carattini (2016). In this respect, the latter find that acceptability depends
on the expectation of both primary and ancillary benefits. Earmarking revenues
for environmental purposes contributes to reduce the hostility to carbon tax, as
well as renaming it “climate contribution”.
The potential of standard surveys is however limited, in particular when re-
spondents are required to deal with complex issues such as the design of carbon
taxes. A few authors have thus opted for choice experiments, which also allow
focusing on the internal validity and thus reduce the room for bias related to
hypothetical answers. Bristow et al. (2010) analyze the acceptability of personal
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carbon trading schemes and carbon taxes with a sample of about 300 individ-
uals. They compare di erent tax rates and modes of recycling and find for
instance that tax thresholds perform particularly well in terms of acceptability.
Thresholds can indeed reduce the regressive e ects of carbon taxes, similarly
to lump-sum recycling. While the authors call for the use of larger samples
to support their findings, they suggest that acceptable carbon tax designs are
not a chimaera. Sælen and Kallbekken (2011) show, with a choice experiment,
that the chances for carbon taxes to be acceptable are higher with earmarking
for environmental revenues. With this type of recycling, the Norwegian pop-
ulation would agree to an increase of the current fuel tax rate by about 15%.
Brannlund and Persson (2012) also test di erent designs for a carbon tax with
a choice experiment. The labeling of the tax changes randomly with the other
attributes and the authors find that even labeling it “other” is better than us-
ing its real name, “tax”. Progressive designs are also preferred to regressive
ones. Gevrek and Uyduranoglu (2015) extend the analysis of the acceptability
of carbon taxes to emerging economies with a choice experiment for Turkey.
While their setting does not allow measuring the overall level of acceptability
of Turkish carbon taxes, their empirical exercise provides very similar findings
to the literature in developed countries, including the preference for progressive
schemes, for earmarking of revenues and for low tax rates.
Choice experiments contribute to tackle the issue of hypothetical bias. How-
ever, inference is still based on stated preferences. Revealed preferences are
elicited in lab experiments, but issues of external validity may arise if the gen-
eral public behaves di erently than the sample participating in the experiment
(Harrison and List 2004). Some examples of lab experiments are available in this
literature. For instance, Kallbekken et al. (2011) provide experimental evidence
in favor of tax aversion and of the demand for earmarking of Pigouvian tax rev-
enues. They show that e ciency and acceptability may conflict even when real
stakes are involved, i.e. participants do not necessarily prefer the policy that
is pay-o  maximizing. Labeling carbon taxes as “fee” helps however to reduce
tax aversion. The experiment of Cherry et al. (2012) supports these findings,
as well as the analysis of Steg et al. (2006), showing that “non-coercive” instru-
ments such as subsidies (and even quotas) are much preferred to carbon taxes,
so that policymakers betting on carbon taxes may end up with the status quo.
In the authors’ words, ine cient “half measures” are more likely to be politically
feasible than e cient “full measures”.
These methods are used as imperfect substitutes for the observation of real
ballots on environmental taxes, which are unthinkable in some countries and very
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rare in others. A few opportunities to study voting behavior on environmental
matters already occurred in the United States or Switzerland (see Deacon and
Shapiro 1975; Fischel 1979; Kahn and Matsusaka 1997; Fort and Bunn 1998;
Salka 2001; Kahn 2002; Stadelmann-Ste en 2011), even though not exclusively
on environmental taxes. An exception is Thalmann (2004), who analyzes three
energy tax proposals voted and rejected by the Swiss population in 2000. While
all proposals failed, two were really close to the majority threshold. Di erences
in the use of revenues (earmarking for subsidizing renewable energy versus re-
distribution) and in the tax rates are shown to potentially contribute to the
small di erences in the rate of approval between the revenue-neutral “Green tax
reform” (44.6% of yes-votes) and the “Energy conservation package” (46.6%).
The third alternative, the “Solar initiative” (31.9%), proposed to earmark half
of the revenues for solar energy, and the other half for energy conservation. Dif-
ferences in the socio-economic and geographic characteristics of voters explain
instead within-proposal variation (see also Halbheer et al. 2006 and Bornstein
and Lanz 2008).
2.2 Local context
On March 8, 2015, the Swiss population voted on a popular initiative launched
by the Green Liberal Party aiming at replacing the current value-added tax
with an energy tax1. The Swiss government and all other parties but the Green
Party were against the initiative. In spite of the low probability of success of the
initiative, the business organizations invested important e orts in a campaign
emphasizing the potential drawbacks of such proposal.
The Green Liberals pointed to the following main arguments in favor of the
initiative:
• Tax dirty energy sources, making renewable energy sources competitive
without subsidization and allowing for a transition towards a more sus-
tainable economy
• Ensure fiscal neutrality, by keeping both the revenues for the government
and the overall tax burden unchanged
• Reward environmentally-friendly consumers, by allowing them to save money
on the VAT while rewarding environmentally-friendly behavior
1The maximum rate of the VAT is 8%. On the same day, the population also voted on a pop-
ular initiative of the Christian Democratic People’s Party of Switzerland aiming at increasing fiscal
exemptions for families with children. This initiative was rejected at 75.4%.
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• Reinforce the local economy, increasing independence from oil producer
states and incentivizing green innovation in Switzerland
• Avoid costs to firms, by eliminating an administratively burdensome tax
such as VAT
The government shared in principle all these objectives, but not the mean to
achieve them as proposed by the initiative. In February 2015 Switzerland was the
first country to submit a pledge to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change’s pledge-and-review system. It pledged to reduce greenhouse
gas emissions by 50% by 2030 with respect to the levels of 1990. However,
the Swiss government opposed the intention to completely erase the VAT and
replace it with an environmental tax, which is supposed to over time reduce
energy consumption, i.e. its own tax base. The government stressed that the
VAT revenues represent the main source of funding for the federal government,
and during the debate a price of 5 francs per liter of gasoline was mentioned
to compensate the fall in VAT revenues2. This would have implied a three-
time increase in the price of gasoline. The government also mentioned a series
of concerns related with the competitiveness and distributional e ects of the
proposed reform.
This scenario was rapidly appropriated by the political parties and organi-
zations opposing the initiative, who claimed that the initiative would have:
• Led to una ordable energy due to exploding energy prices, e.g. 5 francs
per liter of gasoline
• Jeopardized the funding of crucial government’s tasks, since contrary to
the VAT, which represents a stable source of revenues, the energy tax rate
would have had to be regularly increased (and so the price of energy) to
maintain revenues
• Generated adverse competitiveness e ects, putting the country’s prosperity
at risk due to a loss in competitiveness
We consider that the last argument resonated particularly strongly in that spe-
cific period, which followed by a few weeks only the decision of the Swiss National
Bank to drop its euro peg. The ensuing appreciation of the Swiss franc was at the
time expected to put under extreme pressure the many export-oriented sectors
of the Swiss economy.
2Swiss franc close to parity with the US dollar at the time of the ballot.
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The popular initiative was rejected at 92%. The Swiss government renounced
to formulate a counter-proposal, but a few weeks after the ballot announced its
strategy to meet the abovementioned pledges as well as to facilitate the planned
phase out of nuclear energy (the so-called Energy Strategy 2050). This strategy
consists in higher taxes on electricity and heating fuels, while the precise tax
rates are left to further discussion and dependent on the final objectives in terms
of greenhouse gas emissions abatement. Gasoline is also expected to be taxed,
but only after a period of adaptation. We note that Switzerland introduced a
carbon tax in 2008, but only on heating and process fuels. The current tax rate
is 84 CHF per ton of CO2.
3 Methodology
3.1 Analysis of voting behavior
Since 1977, the Swiss Centre of Expertise in the Social Sciences conducts the
VOX survey after each federal ballot. 1500 observations are collected for each
survey. We use these data to assess the determinants of voting behavior on the
March 8 vote on energy taxes. VOX data are widely used to analyze voting
behavior on di erent matters, as they perform well in terms of representativity
and do not present the weaknesses of pure stated-preference studies. We took
advantage of the strong presence of energy issues in the media at the time of
this ballot and the debates following the presentation of the Swiss government’s
new energy strategy to administer a second survey. It uses a choice experiment
format to elicit the acceptability of alternative energy tax designs (see below).
Both surveys were carried out between March and May 2015.
In Switzerland, the rejection of a popular initiative is rather the rule, and
not the exception. From 1891 to date, 9 out of 10 popular initiatives were
rejected at the ballot box (sometimes after having influenced the legislative
process). However, the rejection rate for this initiative is the second highest
since 1891, the highest since 1929. This high rejection rate implies that voters
from all government parties have contributed to reject the initiative, including
the political left. The participation rate (42%) was slightly below the average
participation rate for all popular votes during the period 1991-2014 (43.7%), the
importance of the issue at stake being relatively low compared to the average
ballot, and to hotter energy issues such as nuclear phasing-out.
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3.2 Choice-experiment on alternative designs
3.2.1 Survey setting
Not all designs can be subject to vote. Previous research has shown the im-
portance of the policy design for acceptability and it is thus crucial to have
information on di erent policy attributes and the combination thereof. The
only way to obtain such information from a relatively large sample – that is,
larger than what is usually available in the laboratory – is to rely on stated pref-
erences. It is however possible to set up a survey in a way that it makes choices
and trade-o s the most realistic possible, such as with a choice experiment.
A choice experiment design allows putting the consumers, or voters, in a real-
life situation and, thus, reduces the hypothetical bias. Furthermore, most of the
focus is on the internal validity driven by the comparison of di erent designs. In
our choice experiment, we present all respondents with three potential choices:
two carbon taxes with two di erent designs and the status quo. By giving
to respondents the possibility to reject all proposals, we are able to measure
not only the relative preferences for a given policy attribute, but also the overall
likelihood that a carbon tax can be accepted. The design of the proposed carbon
taxes is the result of the combination of two attributes: the tax rate, measured
in terms of Swiss francs per ton of CO2 emitted, and the use of the tax revenues
(see Table 1). Each respondent is requested to select one of the three options
(two carbon tax designs and the status quo) in 8 di erent hypothetical ballots,
with the attributes being randomly combined at each time. To increase precision
in the identification of the attributes’ e ects, respondents are given one of the
15 randomly-generated versions of the questionnaire.
As all combinations included in the choice experiment were previously part
of a modeling exercise, we are able to provide respondents with information on
the order of magnitude for the expected impacts on the following items of each
carbon tax design:
• Price of gasoline, diesel and heating fuel
• Greenhouse gas emissions abatements. When revenues are used to strengthen
the environmental impact of the policy, we assume that foreign o sets are
purchased and we thus also estimate the e ect on greenhouse gas emis-
sions abroad. We express this reduction in relative terms with respect to
the emissions of Switzerland
• Purchasing power of average Swiss households, based on a proxy for overall
consumption
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Table 1: Choice experiment - attributes and levels
Attributes Levels
Tax rate (CHF/tCO2) 60
90
120
150
Revenue recycling Income tax rebates
VAT rebates
Lump-sum transfers
Social redistribution
Environmental earmarking
• Purchasing power of average low-income households
We provide realistic numbers based on scenarios for 2020 from a dynamic
multi-sectorial multi-household general equilibrium model of the Swiss economy,
called GENESwIS (see Vöhringer 2012)3. For a range of uniform carbon taxes
of 60 to 150 CHF/tCO2, the model achieves domestic emission reductions of
5-15%. Impacts on total consumption are generally negative, up to -0.5% for
a tax rate of 150 CHF/tCO2 combined with environmental recycling. As a
notable exception, a small double dividend can be found for recycling through
reductions of marginal income tax rates. Pure tax reforms with proportional rate
reductions are regressive, and income tax recycling is the most regressive of the
simulated variants. In contrast to this, lump-sum recycling renders the reform
clearly progressive. International carbon o sets are cheap at the moment, and
even very conservative assumptions allow for very sizable additional abatement
abroad when carbon tax revenues are used for purchasing foreign o sets.
The aim of this simulation is to provide su cient information for the most
relevant variables that are supposed to guide voting behavior, replicating the
e ort that a government could do to introduce environmental taxes to the pop-
ulation. Since we carefully explain to respondents the functioning and e ects
3In GENESwIS, households are disaggregated according to living standards and composition.
Households and firms act rationally under perfect foresight and competition, and the government
collects taxes and uses the revenue for public goods provision and social benefits (equal yield is
assumed). Further standard features include international trade with an Armington assumption,
labor-leisure choice, and a putty-clay representation for capital. GENESwIS is based on the 2008
energy related disaggregation of the Swiss Input-Output Table (Nathani et al. 2011), combined with
the population census of the Swiss Federal Statistical O ce (cf. Ecoplan 2012). Core elasticities of
substitution that are relevant for carbon abatement have been taken from Mohler and Müller (2012).
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of carbon taxes, we expect this specific setting to lead to di erent results with
respect to what is most often found in the literature.
The recruitment of participants went as follows. A set of about 4’000 poten-
tial respondents was randomly selected and received by post mail the following
material:
• A letter presenting the study, making participants familiar with the is-
sue and encouraging them to participate in the survey if called by phone,
following the guidelines of Harrison and List (2004)
• A detailed one-page fact sheet explaining how carbon taxes work and the
main implications of each recycling option
• The full set of choice cards for all 8 votes displaying the attributes and
related impacts as estimated by the computable general equilibrium model
(see Figure A.1 for an example)
A randomly drawn sub-set of the about 4000 potential respondents was then
contacted by phone and driven through the questionnaire. In total 1200 indi-
viduals were interviewed. When it came to taking a decision on the hypothetical
ballots, all respondents were read a short and unique text describing the e ects
of each carbon tax type. This ensured that all respondents were provided with
the same information, even those who had not spent time reading the material
that they had received at home. As many already “voted” at home, respondents
were given the possibility to skip the oral explanations4.
3.2.2 Preferences for attributes and carbon taxes
Before identifying the determinants of individual support for a carbon tax, we
hypothesize what they could be, based on our literature review:
Hypothesis 1: Tax rate We expect higher tax rates to lead to lower accept-
ability for carbon taxes, everything else equal
Hypothesis 2: Revenue recycling We expect acceptability to vary substan-
tially depending on the use of revenues. We expect use of revenues for en-
vironmental purposes to increase acceptability the most, followed by social
4In Switzerland, people may be asked to vote several times a year. A few weeks before the day
of voting, all potential voters receive by post mail written information about the ballot, so that
they have the time to form their opinion and also vote by correspondence if wishing so. Our choice
experiment is thus organized in a way that matches standard ballot procedures. We emphasize that
information on proposed policies circulates widely also in democratic countries that do not use the
instruments of direct democracy, even though in di erent forms.
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cushioning addressing potential distributional e ects. We expect lower ac-
ceptability with revenue-neutral recycling. Revenue neutrality (taxing here
and reducing taxes elsewhere) is usually a criterion that the taxpayers do
not request, or understand. This is particularly true in the absence of a
double dividend. We do not have specific priors on the relative ranking
within revenue-neutral recycling methods, i.e. income tax rebates, VAT
reduction and lump-sum transfers
4 Empirical results
4.1 Analysis of voting behavior
The VOX survey mainly consists in a standard list of questions, unchanged
from ballot to ballot, to which are added additional questions specific to each
ballot (some of them on our request). Table 2 presents the main outcomes
for our analysis along with other main variables of interest (see Table A.1 for
descriptive statistics on the characteristics of our VOX respondents, Table A.2
for those of the choice-experiment sample and Table A.3 for the underlying
population)5. As usual, the VOX ballot performs relatively well in predicting
the ballot outcome. The frequency of no-votes in the survey, 90%, is indeed
very close to the real outcome (92%). The survey overestimates instead to some
extent participation, which was in reality 42%. We model participation below,
along with the voting decision. Table 2 displays additional interesting statistics.
For instance, we observe that most people take their decision on the vote on
average 16 days, or about 2 weeks, before the ballot day. Only about 20%
declare to have a set opinion from the start. This shows the importance of
studying political acceptability in the presence of media coverage and political
debates to capture the e ect of (partisan) information on voters. Knowledge of
the initiative is tested directly by the interviewers, based on an open question
introducing the questionnaire.
The survey covers three arguments in favor, and three arguments against the
initiative. These questions are asked only to respondents having participated
in the ballot. Respondents can state their agreement or disagreement with
such statements on a 1 to 4 Likert scale. The higher the score, the higher the
agreement. In general, and not surprisingly comparing with the ballot outcome,
5Predictably, the surveys may slightly under-represent young individuals, and slightly over-
estimate educated, national and (by construction) Italian-speaking people. When appropriate, we
control for these variables with our econometric models. Our main findings are unchanged if using
sampling weights.
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Table 2: VOX data: main outcomes and determinants of voting
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Voting decision
No-vote 0.898 0.302 0 1 914
Participation 0.679 0.467 0 1 1509
Opinion formation
Time of resolution before ballot day -16.314 10.625 -1 -42 714
Immediate resolution 0.186 0.389 0 1 1514
Information
Knowledge of the Energy Strategy 2050 2.767 0.861 1 4 1220
Knowledge of the initiative 0.661 0.473 0 1 1514
Agreement with arguments in favor
Revenue neutrality 2.012 1.006 1 4 856
Environmental e ectiveness 2.652 1.079 1 4 922
Energy security 2.652 1.079 1 4 922
Agreement with arguments against
Competitiveness e ects 3.026 1.004 1 4 908
Distributional e ects 2.922 1.056 1 4 906
Decreasing tax base 3.002 1.012 1 4 852
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arguments against the initiative score substantially higher than those in favor.
In line with the literature, high concern is expressed for the competitiveness
and distributional e ects potentially generated by the implementation of the
proposal. Another argument widely used by the opponents was that over time a
decreasing tax base would have systematically implied higher tax rates, and so
larger e ects on the price of energy, on competitiveness and on the distribution of
income. This argument also seems to have been well understood by the public.
Consistently, the pro argument emphasizing revenue neutrality as a desirable
property of the initiative did not receive much support, which corroborates the
related stylized fact highlighted in the literature. The fact that higher fossil fuel
prices would have resulted in a higher degree of independence from oil and gas
exporters, and thus increased energy security, was moderately seen as a positive
property of the energy tax. Among the pro arguments, the one that scores the
highest relates with the e ectiveness of energy taxes. The relative question asks
respondents whether they believe that an energy tax creates incentives to save
energy, and to switch to renewable energy. Yet, this straightforward question
about the incentive e ect of energy taxes does not receive massive support, and
actually performs poorly in relative terms with respect to e.g. competitiveness
concerns. Once again, we observe how the e ectiveness of energy taxes is not
an established fact for the general public, and its ability to change behavior is
not shared by all the population.
We now analyze the determinants of voting behavior, and participation in
the ballot. Since these two outcomes are jointly determined, we would face a
selection problem if assessing voting behavior without taking into account the
decision to participate or not in the ballot. We stress that participation is not
compulsory in all cantons but one, the latter representing about 1% of the total
population. We hence apply a standard Heckman selection strategy, and esti-
mate jointly the probability to participate in the ballot, and to express either
a “yes-” or a “no-vote”. Since both outcomes are binary, we use a Heckman-
selection probit model. The selection of variables follows Thalmann (2004), who
had used comparable VOX data. We start with a reduced model including only
“objective” socio-economic characteristics potentially a ecting the decision to
participate in the ballot, or to accept the initiative. We include gender, dum-
mies for age categories, education, the number of cars in household (as a proxy
for carbon footprint), and the location of the voter, in terms of linguistic region
and with respect to the urban-rural cleavage. The procedure suggested in Thal-
mann (2004) implies running a second model, in which additional “subjective”
variables are added to the “objective” model. From the standard questions of
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the VOX survey, we indeed know some general preferences, political priorities
and concerns of the voters in our sample, as reported by respondents. In line
with Thalmann (2004), we consider as potentially relevant for this ballot the
following variables: concern with unemployment, with income inequality, and
with public intervention in the economy. We also include a variable capturing
the political a nity as declared by the respondents, based on the stated political
positioning at the last national elections. Given that only two parties supported
the popular initiative, the Green Liberals, its promoters, and the Green Party,
while all others strongly opposed it, including all leftist parties, we capture sup-
port for either one of the two parties as a measure of a nity with green parties
(called “green a nity” hereafter).
The top panel of Table 3 presents the estimates for the “objective” model.
All coe cients are statistically significant in the participation model. Most
estimates carry the expected sign: both higher education and age are correlated
to a higher likelihood to participate in a ballot. Participation rates are higher
for male individuals and in German speaking areas compared to French (the
dummy of reference) and Italian speaking areas. Rural areas also experience
higher turnout. These di erences are very similar to those found by Thalmann
(2004), and mirror general voting behavior in Switzerland. Interestingly, car
ownership is also associated with a higher ballot participation.
Taking into account self-selection into voting, the vote model assesses the ef-
fect of the previous variables on the likelihood to express a yes-vote in the ballot.
Higher education is found to be positively correlated with pro-environmental be-
havior, a common finding in the literature already at the time of the theoretical
and empirical analysis of Californian referenda by Deacon and Shapiro (1975).
Females are less likely to support the initiative, while young generations and
older individuals are less likely to support energy taxes, exactly as in Thal-
mann (2004). The intuition is the following. Elderly are expected to benefit less
from climate change mitigation. For young voters, two opposing e ects may be
at play: they have a higher probability to experience climate change, but are
possibly also more exposed to labor market shocks.
Interestingly, we find that, in statistical terms, car ownership explains par-
ticipation only, and not voting behavior. Yet, we note the expected negative
sign, as car ownership represents our proxy for exposure to higher energy prices.
The bottom panel of Table 3 introduces the subjective variables. Most of the
previous results concerning participation are robust to the addition of general
political concerns and a nity. Among the subjective variables, only concern
with unemployment is significantly linked to participation, with a positive sign
17
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as expected. The positive but non-significant e ect for green a nity suggests
that the sponsors and supporters of the initiative were not really able to mobilize
their voters to participate in the ballot .The picture is slightly di erent for vot-
ing choice. Only gender and the age dummy for the youngest voters significantly
a ect the decision to cast a yes-vote in the ballot. The subjective variables seem
to substantially contribute to explain variation in the model. In particular, we
note how green a nity is linked to a higher propensity to support the initiative
of the Green Liberals6. While the marginal e ect is relatively small in absolute
value, with only a 10% higher probability to vote yes for respondents declaring
themselves as greens, the magnitude of this e ect is very large in relative terms.
Green voters may have intrinsically supported the initiative, or voted strategi-
cally in favor to avoid a major defeat. Polls were indeed forecasting a rejection
as the most probable outcome, even though such debacle came clearly unex-
pected. In line with predictions, concern with income inequality, with public
intervention, and with unemployment are associated with a negative coe cient,
while the latter not in a statistically significant way. That is, the subjective
variables seem to capture the main complaints with the proposal. To better
understand the major impediments to a yes-vote, we exploit the pros and cons
as introduced by Table 2. We recall that these variables are observed only for
the respondents declaring to have participated in the ballot. Hence, we run a
simple probit model, skipping the participation stage. Outcomes of interest are
compared with the estimates of Table 3.
Table 4 shows the estimates for this additional model. Among the objective
variables, only one significantly explains voting behavior once taking into ac-
count subjective variables and opinions on the popular initiative. This variable
is the number of cars in the households, which now reaches statistical signifi-
cance. That is, as in Thalmann (2004), the number of cars could be a measure
of people’s economic sensitivity to higher energy prices, as families with more
cars are less likely to approve the initiative. Concerning subjective variables,
the concern for public intervention remains significant, and its magnitude vir-
tually unchanged with respect to Table 3. Green a nity keeps its significance,
although the marginal e ect is reduced. People’s opinions on the pro and con
arguments mentioned by the survey are the main drivers of voting behavior. All
variables have the expected sign, and comparable magnitudes. Only the coe -
6Given the small proportion of green voters, we estimate the joint e ect of supporting either one
of the two green parties. Both variables would positively a ect the probability of casting a yes-vote
if used separately. If additional variables for other parties would be included in the model, a negative
and significant marginal e ect could be found for supporting a centre-right party called FDP, or “The
Liberals”. Besides these facts, no clear right-left pattern could be discerned in the voting model. All
additional estimations are available by the authors upon request.
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Table 4: Probit model including pros and cons
Coe cient (S.E.) Marginal e ects (S.E.)
Gender (1 = F) -0.311 (0.203) -0.011 (0.008)
Young (1 = 18-29 years) -0.478 (0.427) -0.017 (0.016)
Elderly (1 = 60+ years) -0.301 (0.207) -0.011 (0.009)
German speaking 0.256 (0.278) 0.009 (0.010)
Italian speaking 0.080 (0.360) 0.003 (0.013)
Education (1 = high school+) -0.130 (0.217) -0.005 (0.008)
Number of cars in household -0.457** (0.132) -0.016** (0.007)
Rural municipality -0.051 (0.228) -0.002 (0.008)
Concern with unemployment -0.042 (0.079) -0.002 (0.003)
Concern with income inequality 0.019 (0.065) 0.0006 (0.002)
Concern with public intervention -0.085* (0.059) -0.003* (0.002)
Green a nity 0.628** (0.260) 0.022** (0.011)
Revenue neutrality 0.617*** (0.103) 0.022** (0.007)
Environmental e ectiveness 0.378*** (0.110) 0.013** (0.005)
Energy security 0.181* (0.108) 0.007* (0.004)
Competitiveness e ects -0.394** (0.094) -0.014** (0.005)
Regressive e ects -0.165* (0.089) -0.006* (0.003)
Decreasing tax base -0.057 (0.099) -0.002 (0.003)
Intercept -1.567* (0.848)
N 607
Pseudo R2 0.503
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01.
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cient for the argument that a decreasing tax base could be problematic is too
small to be statistically significant. The adverse consequences of a decreasing
tax base may already be accounted for by the other variables.
When looking at the marginal e ects for these arguments, we observe that the
Green Liberals’ popular initiative was rejected based on the very same contrary
arguments that are most often mentioned in the literature. Similarly, the pro
arguments contributed to higher acceptability, but their lower uptake among the
general public, again in line with the literature, did not help to substantially
move the balance in favor of the reform.
For instance, the higher the agreement with revenue neutrality being con-
sidered a positive aspect of the proposed reform, the higher the likelihood to
have voted yes. Yet, on average people were not particularly enthusiastic about
revenue neutrality. The same applies to the energy security argument, whose
agreement is also linked to a higher probability of approving the proposal. A re-
current finding concerning the perception of environmental e ectiveness, largely
discussed in the introductory parts, is corroborated by our ballot data. Being
relatively confident that energy taxes provide an incentive to decrease energy
consumption and to switch to cleaner sources is linked with a higher probabil-
ity of a yes-vote. The magnitude of this e ect may look relatively small if we
compare with other survey studies testing the e ect of perceived e ectiveness on
acceptability in a similar fashion, such as Baranzini and Carattini (2016). How-
ever, assessing the relevance of this and the other e ects should take into account
the overall outcome of the ballot, very well replicated by the VOX survey. In
this light, the e ects that we measure are considerable.
Similar considerations apply to the contrary arguments. The only di er-
ence is that these were on average considered as much more relevant than the
arguments concerning pros. Competitiveness e ects were already determinant
in the ballot analyzed by Thalmann (2004), in spite of an unemployment level
below 2% at that time in Switzerland. At the time of the ballot that we an-
alyze, the unemployment rate was comfortably below 4%. Similarly to other
contexts, competitiveness concerns often take the center stage when it comes to
take important political decisions on climate policy. This can happen in spite of
the overall minimal adverse e ects on competitiveness observed so far (cf. e.g.
Mathys and de Melo 2011). For instance, when designing their carbon taxes,
Scandinavian countries opted for very generous exemptions to energy-intensive
industries on competitiveness grounds, avoiding important profit losses to the
firms concerned, but also watering down the environmental e ects of the pol-
icy (Baranzini and Carattini 2014). The industry-flight argument and related
21
Table 5: Preferred modes of recycling
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Subsidies for e ciency and renewables 0.568 0.496 0 1
Social cushioning 0.115 0.320 0 1
Reduction in existing taxes 0.13 0.337 0 1
Redistribution to households and firms 0.186 0.389 0 1
fears of substantial competitiveness e ects largely contributed to the policy re-
versal observed in the case of the Australian carbon tax (cf. Spash and Lo
2012). Hence, the general public may tend to overestimate competitiveness ef-
fects, and this may be the result of very e ective political campaigning from
energy-intensive industries and fossil energy providers (cf. Ingold and Varone
2012).
Following the previous argument, we complete the analysis by testing the
potential popularity of alternative recycling schemes. Two specific questions
were introduced to respondents, asking them to mention their preferred recy-
cling option, freely, first, and then among a list of four options. These options
are: subsidies for e ciency improvements and renewable energy (environmental
earmarking), social cushioning, reduction in existing taxes, and redistribution
to households and firms. Most answers given in the open question correspond
to one of these four categories. The results of the open question, in which re-
spondents are not influenced by the options given by the questionnaire, are thus
very similar to those of the closed question, displayed in Table 5.
Unsurprisingly, about 60% of respondents would like revenues from energy
taxes to be used in the environmental domain. This result confirms previous
findings in the literature, and suggests that Swiss voters are not di erent from
the other samples analyzed so far. Only a small fraction of the population would
use tax revenues to provide social cushioning, or to reduce existing taxes, and
that in spite of the concerns expressed for distributional and competitiveness ef-
fects. Similar findings on this apparent inconsistency were already provided by
Baranzini and Carattini (2016), based on a specific Swiss canton. Apparently,
such concerns a ect the decision to accept of not an energy tax at a given tax
rate, but do not call for a diversion of revenues from environmental earmark-
ing. Redistribution to households and firms, the current way of redistributing
revenues from the existing Swiss carbon tax on heating fuels, is supported by
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about one fifth of the sample only7. That is, if voters were asked to vote on the
use of revenues of the current scheme, and absent any additional information,
they would probably reject lump-sum transfers, and favor a switch towards full
earmarking of revenues.
4.2 Choice experiment on alternative carbon tax designs
In this section we analyze decision making in our full-information choice-experiment
setting and compare it with the observed real voting behavior, and with the pre-
vious literature, with the aim of testing our two main hypotheses concerning tax
rates and recycling modes. Table 6 presents our main estimates. All columns
display marginal e ects from conditional logit. Column (1) shows estimates for
the full sample, i.e. 1189 individuals. Since we survey a representative sample
of the population living in Switzerland, not all respondents are Swiss nationals
and so entitled to vote. Hence, column (2) restricts the sample to nationals
only. Among nationals, we know self-declared participation to the usual four
ballots per year. Column (3) excludes non-voters while column (4) retains only
people declaring 100% ballot participation. Since all results remain the same
in qualitative terms and most of the time also in quantitative terms, we discuss
results based on column (1). The fact that we find similar results for di erent
sub-samples is however an interesting finding in itself. That is, foreign respon-
dents would not vote di erently than Swiss citizens, according to this sample
and for this matter. If we exclude those individuals that are most likely to
abstain to better predict the outcome of a potential ballot, the results are also
virtually unchanged. The propensity to vote seems thus to have no influence
on how people perceive the tax designs proposed in our study, in spite of the
non-negligible changes in observations across columns.
As expected, a higher tax rate is linked to a lower acceptability, everything
else equal. This follows from economic theory and is in line with Sælen and
Kallbekken (2011), Brannlund and Persson (2012) and Gevrek and Uyduranoglu
(2015). However, the di erence between 0 and 60 francs is relatively small in
comparison with the other tax rates. Hence, in some situations, people might
have preferred a carbon tax, with a moderate tax rate, than no carbon tax at
all. Given that the tax rate of the current Swiss carbon tax on heating fuels
was already fixed at 60 francs at the time of the survey, we did not include in
the survey a lower tax rate, e.g. of 30 francs. Furthermore, we note that except
for the first step from 0 to 60 francs, the progression is almost linear, suggesting
7Note that up one third of revenues are earmarked for subsidies for energy e ciency in buildings.
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that a well-shaped linear demand would be a good approximation for the case
of carbon taxes.
This linearity allows speculating on the negative impact on acceptability of
an extremely high rate, as the one suggested by the popular initiative promoted
by the Green Liberals and rejected by the Swiss population. While promoters
of and opponents to the popular initiative were disagreeing on the proposal’s
expected impact on energy prices, depending on the time horizon that they used
in their campaigning, our most conservative computations suggest that in the
short term the tax rate would have had to be of at least 300 CHF per ton of
CO2 to replace the revenues of the VAT. Figure 1 extrapolates linearly from
the probabilities of success that we observe based on the tax rates proposed by
the survey and predicts the outcome of an initiative proposing a tax rate of 300
CHF per ton of CO2 (see Table A.4 for descriptive statistics). For a like-to-like
comparison, Figure 1 shows only the predicted likelihood of success if revenues
were to be used as proposed by the Green Liberals. While interpreting any
out-of-sample prediction always requires a lot of precaution, our extrapolation
provides support for the external validity of our choice experiment. At a rate of
300 CHF per ton of CO2 the predicted support is virtually zero, which is very
close to the share of yes-votes in the public ballot. That is, if anything, our
choice experiment predicts lower support than the ballot.
The Green Liberals’ popular initiative could probably have had a better
outcome with a di erent use of tax revenues. As the estimates show, reducing
the current value added tax is not linked to any higher acceptability with respect
to income tax rebates (the reference case, omitted due to multicollinearity).
Together, these two revenue-recycling options are the most unpopular. This
result comes as expected and confirms our hypothesis on the low support for
revenue neutrality. In this respect, it is important to recall that based on the
modeling exercise we find none or little double dividend with these two ways to
recycle revenues, the net e ect on the domestic purchasing power being broadly
as negative as with the other types of recycling. This confirms a general result
in the double-dividend literature (Goulder 1995). Hence, respondents informed
about the potential beneficial e ects of reducing distortionary taxes knew that
they should not be expecting a double dividend from lower income taxes or a
reduction in the value-added tax.
We are however surprised by the estimates concerning lump-sum transfers,
environmental recycling and to some extent social cushioning. The results that
we provide for these variables are novel in the literature and deserve to be ana-
lyzed carefully. The signs for these variables are positive, negative and positive,
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Table 6: Choice experiment - Estimates from conditional logit
Full sample Nationals Without no-voters Always voters
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Tax rate
0 CHF (reference)
60 CHF -0.018 -0.030 -0.037** -0.043*
(0.015) (0.016) (0.067) (0.020)
90 CHF -0.052*** -0.059*** -0.065*** -0.070***
(0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.021)
120 CHF -0.107*** -0.122*** -0.123*** -0.122***
(0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.020)
150 CHF -0.177*** -0.186*** -0.193*** -0.200***
(0.018) (0.016) (0.017) (0.02)
Revenue recycling
Income tax rebate (reference)
VAT reduction -0.013 -0.010 -0.012 -0.016
(0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.016)
Lump-sum redistribution 0.137*** 0.136*** 0.135*** 0.127***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.016)
Social cushioning 0.144*** 0.145*** 0.144*** 0.135***
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.016)
Environmental recycling -0.021 -0.029* -0.035** -0.056**
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.018)
Number of individuals 1189 1066 980 650
Number of hypothetical votes 28536 25584 23520 15600
Pseudo-R2 0.0342 0.0360 0.0351 0.0404
Note: Estimates report marginal e ects from conditional logit.
The dependent variable measures the acceptability of the proposed carbon tax designs.
Robust standard error in parentheses. * p < 0.1 , ** p < 0.05 , ***p < 0.01.
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Figure 1: Prediction with VAT recycling as in the Green Liberals’ initiative
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Note: Filled circles indicate observations in the sample, empty circles indicate observations
obtained through extrapolation.
respectively. That is, we find that lump-sum transfers and social cushioning are
the most preferred options for recycling, while environmental recycling does not
seem to obtain the support that it usually does in the literature. We have an
explanation for all the three facts, as well as important policy implications.
Let us start with the relatively high acceptability of the lump-sum redis-
tribution. The modeling exercise suggests moderate net gains for low-income
households with lump-sum transfers. Only social cushioning does better, while
the remaining types of recycling involve regressive e ects. Respondents are
informed about this fact and can internalize the beneficial distributional prop-
erties of lump-sum redistribution. Furthermore, respondents are informed by
the introductory material that the current carbon tax on heating fuels is mostly
redistributed through lump-sum transfers and it may be that this information
could have increased the legitimacy of this type of recycling. This information is
public, but according to Baranzini and Carattini (2016) only a limited number
of individuals are aware of the current carbon tax on heating fuel, and an even
smaller proportion knows how its revenues are redistributed (one fourth of the
1012 respondents interviewed in INFRAS 2015).
However, the most important finding concerns the low demand for recycling
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for environmental purposes. This result is at odds with most of the literature
on the acceptability of environmental taxes previously discussed. This is the
first study providing survey respondents with an estimate of the emission abate-
ments linked with the carbon taxes about which respondents are requested to
express their opinion. Interviewers were instructed on how to provide simple ex-
planations on the price sensitivity of consumers and they reportedly had to use
such information to answer the general public’s curiosity on the economic bases
for the figures for emissions abatements included in the choice cards. That is,
our survey addressed by construction one of the main obstacle to carbon taxes:
perceived ine ectiveness, which often goes hand in hand with earmarking for
environmental purposes. Since all carbon taxes in the survey are shown to be
e ective, and to the extent that the scientific credibility of our study was not
challenged by respondents, the main driver for the demand for environmental
recycling is wiped out. We also note that the demand for environmental recy-
cling expressed so often in the literature may not necessarily correspond to the
most e ective way of obtaining additional emission abatements as economists
would interpret it. Even with a conservative estimate for the price of emissions
on foreign carbon markets, the revenues of a carbon tax between 60 and 150
francs per ton of CO2 can lead to very large emission abatements abroad. All
scenarios imply substantial negative emissions: even the lowest tax rate is shown
to lead to abatements equivalent to five times Swiss emissions. Therefore, at
the current carbon price levels, it would be very tempting for policymakers to
purchase many years of carbon neutrality and so achieve long-term pledges, such
as “the balance” between emissions and removals by sinks, at an extremely low
cost. However, we understand that the respondents in our survey may wonder
why compensating so much. The general public may also do not like the pur-
chase of foreign carbon credits more in general. People may have a preference
for local investments, which provide a number of local co-benefits, and may also
have ethical or practical reservations with respect to the use of o sets in general
(see Conte and Kotchen 2010; Anderson 2012; Carattini and Tavoni 2016).
Finally, the relative popularity of social cushioning does not completely sur-
prise, given that distributional e ects were made completely salient to respon-
dents. Social cushioning is shown to provide the most progressive e ects over all
types of recycling, although lump-sum transfers perform similarly with moderate
tax rates.
Figure 2 extends the simulation of Figure 1 with the most popular recycling
options, lump-sum recycling and social cushioning. As Figure 1 already showed,
our exercise suggests that even with an extremely low tax rate recycling through
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Figure 2: Prediction with alternative recycling compared to VAT recycling
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VAT rebates could hardly provide a majority in favor of a carbon tax. With
social cushioning, and especially lump-sum transfers, the picture is di erent.
While none of the two recycling options lead us to a majority with the tax
rates considered by our survey, the prediction for recycling through lump-sum
transfers suggests that anything below 60 CHF per ton of CO2 would be in
principle acceptable. This was the rate of the carbon tax at the time of the
vote (since 2016 it is at 84 CHF), but it applies only to heating and process
fuels, not vehicle fuels. While we recall the necessary precautions in taking at
face values such predictions, we stress how recycling modes can completely shift
the demand for carbon taxes, possibly also beyond the required threshold to
make them acceptable. Based on these findings, we reformulate hypothesis 2 as
follows:
Hypothesis 2: Revenue recycling We expect acceptability to vary substan-
tially depending on the use of revenues. In relative terms, we expect lower
acceptability with revenue-neutral recycling, as revenue neutrality (tax-
ing here and reducing taxes elsewhere) is shown to be a criterion that
the taxpayers probably generally do not request, or understand. This is
particularly true in the absence of a double dividend. Lump-sum redis-
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tribution can however be associated to higher acceptability provided that
its progressive properties are made explicit. If distributional e ects are
salient, social cushioning and lump-sum redistribution can lead to higher
acceptability. Providing information on the e ectiveness of the carbon tax
reduces the usual demand for revenue recycling for environmental rein-
forcement. Some types of environmental recycling may even cause lower
support, such as recycling through the purchase of foreign carbon credits.
Finally, we consider how exploiting heterogeneity across individuals may pro-
vide further information on people’s preferences for carbon taxes. Similarly to
e.g. Gevrek and Uyduranoglu (2015), we apply a latent-class model to ex-
plain heterogeneous preferences. According to our data, 5 latent classes can be
identified8. Table A.5 in the Appendix displays how preferences change across
classes, based again on a conditional logit model. Table A.6 introduces informa-
tion on the characteristics of respondents, aiming at describing the composition
of classes using a multinomial logit model9.
We briefly summarize the insights from this additional analysis. Classes
are divided based on the importance given to each attribute (price or revenue
recycling), on the preference for revenue recycling, the elasticity to variation
in the tax rate, and overall acceptability. Low-income households tend to be
associated with classes showing a marked preference for progressive designs,
i.e. through lump-sum redistribution of revenues or social cushioning. The
overall degree of acceptability, and the related sensitivity to tax rates, seems to
be linked to di erent degrees of climate concern. Classes with lower degrees of
climate concern tend to be linked to rather elastic behavior, and low to moderate
overall acceptability. While a positive correlation between concern for climate
mitigation and preferences for tighter climate policy is common in the literature
(see Drews and van den Bergh 2015), we are, to the best of our knowledge, the
first to empirically document di erent preferences for the distributional e ects
of carbon taxes across the income distribution.
4.3 Discussion
Tax rate We find that higher tax rates clearly imply lower acceptability. This
fact recalls once again the general public’s sensibility with respect to the cost of
climate policy, above all when the latter is as transparent as with carbon taxes.
8AIC (BIC) values are given as follows: for two classes, 15495 (15616); for three classes, 14835
(15021); for four classes, 14620 (14870); for five classes, 14427 (14741).
9The number of observations is limited for a series of variables, such as income or commuting
preferences for workers.
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As pointed out in the literature, this reminds policymakers of the importance
of proceedings in small steps (Baranzini and Carattini 2014). Starting at a
moderate price level may also reduce the opposition from energy-intensive lob-
bies, even though some evidence suggests that vested interests may be mobilized
against any departure from the status quo (see e.g. Rocchi et al. 2014)10. In this
respect, it is important that policymakers have at their disposal estimates of the
potential competitiveness e ects of carbon taxes. These are indeed likely to be
small overall and should not be overemphasized. Our results suggest that the
general public is likely to be ready to give up some fraction of national income,
if they have no doubts on the environmental e ectiveness of the measures that
they are supporting. Hence, resistance to carbon taxes seems not to be due to
complete free riding in the provision of the global public good which is climate
change mitigation, thus supporting the idea of some degree of cooperation in
the climate commons (cf. Ostrom 2009; Carattini et al. 2015; Carattini 2015).
Gradual introduction and information The acceptability for a given in-
strument may increase once the instrument is in place, supporting the use of
moderate tax rates to start. This for three reasons. First, the role of relative
consumption: once the tax in place, people realize that their purchasing power
compared to the others around them may be actually unchanged (Howarth 2006;
Gowdy 2008). Second, the role of revenue recycling: revenue neutrality can in-
crease acceptability ex post, once people see that they are given some of the
money back. Of course, this requires the redistribution of revenues to be su -
ciently salient. With full redistribution, some households may be net winners,
as with feebates. Third, the role of observing the functioning of the policy:
as discussed, the general public tends to underestimate the e ectiveness of en-
vironmental taxes, especially absent any recycling for environmental purposes.
However, if the e ect of the policy is su ciently salient, people may review their
beliefs ex post, causing an important gap between perceived e ectiveness (and
thus acceptability) ex ante and ex post. Evidence in this sense is provided for
instance by Carattini et al. (2016), who exploit the forced implementation of
pricing garbage by the bag on a relatively large population to assess its overall
e ectiveness, and its acceptability both before and after the implementation.
People are very concerned with pricing ex ante, but implementing the policy
substantially reduces concerns with e ectiveness and fairness. Similarly, Kall-
bekken and Sælen (2011) have argued in favor of the use of trial periods, based
10The descriptive statistics in Table A.2 report that a substantial majority of the choice-experiment
sample would have a preference for a carbon tax that starts low and increases over time.
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on the successful example of the Stockholm congestion charge (see also Cherry
et al. 2014). In the specific case of carbon taxes, Murray and Rivers (2015)
show based on poll data how resistence against British Columbia’s carbon tax
substantially decreased after its introduction, with positive spillovers to the rest
of Canada. In the case under consideration, we note that although Switzerland
has already a carbon tax on heating and process fuels, an important fraction of
the population is not aware of its existence.
Our choice experiment was designed to inform voters on the e ectiveness of
the incentive tax, something that is generally missing in similar studies in the
literature as well as in the political arena.
Revenue recycling Selling an environmental tax reform may be hard, but
not impossible. Our findings from the choice experiment support the decision of
the Swiss government to go for full lump-sum recycling in the planned extension
of the current carbon tax on heating fuels to all fuels, as announced in March
2015. However, our specific framework provides more detailed information that
usually done in the public arena. As emphasized based on the VOX data, absent
any additional information the general public would probably reject lump-sum
transfers in favor of environmental earmarking. That is, policymakers should
be willing to undertake the e ort that is needed to reduce the informational
gap between them and the general public. In our case, we provided respondents
with clear and concise information on how carbon taxes work, on the mecha-
nisms through which higher energy prices lead to lower energy consumption –
including scenarios for emission abatements – and on the competitiveness and
distributional e ects of each type of revenue recycling for any given tax rate.
Explaining how lump-sum redistribution works and how it can be progressive
will be a first step in favor of higher acceptability of revenue-neutral designs.
We also believe that providing figures for the expected emission abatements
will also improve acceptability and decrease the demand for environmental re-
cycling. In this case we stress how it is crucial to explain to the population
how the incentive e ect works. These figures could also emphasize the exis-
tence of co-benefits for the local population. Expecting positive co-benefits is
indeed associated with higher willingness to pay for climate change mitigation
(Longo et al. 2012) as well as higher acceptability of carbon taxes (Baranzini
and Carattini 2016).
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5 Conclusions
Pledges are not per se credible policy commitments. The ability of countries to
turn pledges into cost-e ective policies such as carbon taxes will determine the
possibility to ramp up future ambitions and to push for further policy tighten-
ing. The implementation of carbon taxes has experienced a hard time in many
countries, so far. Learning from these experiences is crucial to increase their
popularity and broaden their implementation in a post-Paris world.
This paper analyzes voting behavior in a real ballot on energy taxes in
Switzerland. Revenues from these energy taxes were to replace completely the
current value-added tax. The proposal was massively rejected. We collect data
on a large representative sample of voters. We find that several obstacles lim-
ited its acceptability, such as distributional and competitiveness concerns and
perceived environmental ine ectiveness. Given the perception of little environ-
mental e ects, revenue neutrality is not a priori a solution for the general public.
These energy taxes would have instead been more popular if revenues were to
be earmarked for environmental purposes.
At the same time of the ballot, we administer a choice-experiment survey,
exploiting the salience of the topic. The choice experiment addresses all the
obstacles emphasized by the analysis of real voting behavior. Based on a com-
putable general equilibrium model, it provides information to all respondents
on the social, economic and environmental impacts for di erent tax rates and
use of revenues. We analyze the demand for carbon taxes for each design and
show that this information leads to a very di erent outcome compared to the
ballot and the literature. First of all, revenue-neutral policies can become pop-
ular, provided that their progressive properties are emphasized as in the case of
lump-sum transfers. Second, environmental earmarking may no longer be abso-
lutely necessary to receive a substantial support for carbon taxes, if information
is provided on their environmental e ectiveness.
Based on our findings we argue that policy designs usually preferred by
economists, but in most cases opposed by the general public, are not neces-
sarily unpopular, provided that the general public shares at least some of the
information that economists have. Our findings can help devise e ective car-
bon taxes that are accepted by citizens, because they are convincingly shown to
be environmentally e ective and because their revenues are refunded in a form
that mitigates their burden on low-income households. Addressing the concerns
and limited information of the general public is probably the only way to avoid
important resistances to cost-e ective instruments of climate change mitigation,
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which could put at risk the realization of the current pledges and potentially
jeopardize their necessary tightening. The consequences are known. The inabil-
ity to turn Paris pledges into policy would this time hardly leave any room to
avoid running into dangerous climate changes.
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Appendix
A.1 Figures
Figure A.1: Example of a choice card
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A.2 Tables
Table A.1: VOX data - Sample composition
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Gender (female) 0.526 0.5 0 1 1514
Age 18-29 (young) 0.117 0.321 0 1 1514
Age 30-59 0.532 0.499 0 1 1514
Age 60+ (elderly) 0.351 0.477 0 1 1514
German speaking 0.534 0.499 0 1 1514
French speaking 0.267 0.442 0 1 1514
Italian speaking 0.199 0.399 0 1 1514
Education (high school+) 0.616 0.486 0 1 1514
Number of cars in household 1.381 1.031 0 9 1514
Rural municipality 0.258 0.437 0 1 1514
Concern with unemployment 4.846 1.487 1 6 1488
Concern with income inequality 3.952 1.649 1 8 1489
Concern with public intervention 4.249 1.668 1 6 1444
Green a nity 0.063 0.243 0 1 1514
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Table A.2: Choice experiment - Sample composition
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Socio-economic characteristics:
Gender (male) 0.487 0.5 0 1 1200
Age 51.711 15.263 18 94 1200
National 0.897 0.305 0 1 1200
Education (years of) 15.341 2.072 11 18 1196
Household size 2.884 1.333 1 8 1200
Household annual income:
<35’000 CHF 0.06 0.237 0 1 957
35’000-50’000 CHF 0.144 0.351 0 1 957
50’000-80’000 CHF 0.242 0.429 0 1 957
80’000-120’000 CHF 0.304 0.46 0 1 957
120’000-160’000 CHF 0.154 0.361 0 1 957
160’000-200’000 CHF 0.047 0.212 0 1 957
>200’000 CHF 0.049 0.216 0 1 957
Geographical location:
German speaking 0.542 0.498 0 1 1200
French speaking 0.292 0.455 0 1 1200
Italian speaking 0.167 0.373 0 1 1200
Urban agglomeration 0.264 0.441 0 1 1200
Environmental attitudes:
Main transport for commuting:
Car 0.578 0.494 0 1 969
Bicycle 0.195 0.396 0 1 969
Bus 0.227 0.419 0 1 969
Concern for climate change:
Very threatening 0.405 0.491 0 1 1189
Somewhat threatening 0.476 0.500 0 1 1189
Not threatening 0.119 0.324 0 1 1189
Preference for gradual carbon tax 0.635 0.482 0 1 1200
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Table A.3: Swiss population - Socio-economic characteristics for comparison
Variable Mean
Socio-economic characteristics:
Gender (female) 0.505
Age 18-29 (young) 0.149
Age 30-59 0.448
Age 60+ (elderly) 0.234
National 0.757
Education (high school+) 0.521
Household size 2.25
Geographical location:
German speaking 0.633
French speaking 0.227
Italian speaking 0.081
Rural municipality 0.17
Environmental attitudes:
Votes to the Green Party 0.063
Votes to the Green Liberal Party 0.072
Source: All variables come from Swiss Statistics and concern the end of 2014.
Election data concern the federal elections of 2015.
Table A.4: Choice experiments - Descriptive statistics
Tax rate
60 CHF 90 CHF 120 CHF 150 CHF
Re
cy
cli
ng
Income tax rebate 0.352 0.317 0.273 0.175
VAT reduction 0.319 0.319 0.229 0.193
Lump-sum redistribution 0.496 0.432 0.374 0.321
Social cushioning 0.455 0.441 0.410 0.359
Environmental recycling 0.350 0.295 0.215 0.148
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Table A.5: Latent classes - Estimates from conditional logit
Latent classes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Tax rate
0 CHF (reference)
60 CHF -0.130*** 0.326*** -0.314*** 0.582*** 0.0161
(0.032) (0.013) (0.028) (0.0110) (0.026)
90 CHF -0.099** 0.377*** -0.425*** 0.432*** -0.167***
(0.032) (0.010) (0.036) (0.017) (0.025)
120 CHF -0.069* 0.379*** -0.387*** 0.266*** -0.308***
(0.023) (0.011) (0.033) (0.019) (0.028)
150 CHF -0.119*** 0.373*** -0.372*** 0.126*** -0.463***
(0.028) (0.011) (0.035) (0.025) (0.031)
Revenue recycling
Income tax rebate (reference)
VAT reduction -0.0004 -0.009 -0.094* 0.038 0.002
(0.030) (0.008) (0.044) (0.021) (0.029)
Lump-sum redistribution 0.552*** 0.034*** -0.027 0.059** 0.125***
(0.031) (0.008) (0.039) (0.022) (0.026)
Social cushioning 0.589*** 0.051*** 0.0095 0.054* 0.104***
(0.0302) (0.008) (0.034) (0.023) (0.031)
Environmental recycling -0.051 -0.018* -0.067 0.019 0.063
(0.038) (0.009) (0.042) (0.020) (0.033)
N 3861 8190 6564 4191 5334
Pseudo-R2 0.3752 0.3523 0.8726 0.5399 0.1635
Note: Estimates report marginal e ects from conditional logit. The dependent variable measures the
acceptability of the proposed carbon tax designs. Robust standard error in parentheses.
* p < 0.1 , ** p < 0.05 , ***p < 0.01.
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